

Formal Complaint to the eSafety Commissioner – Coordinated International Harassment and Defamation Campaign

Date: 4 August 2025

To: Office of the Australian eSafety Commissioner

From: Anthony Brodie, Owner – Legion Killfeed (Sydney, Australia)

Contact Email: legionkillfeed@outlook.com

Re: Ongoing Coordinated Online Harassment/Defamation Campaign Targeting Australian Citizen & Business (Context: Prior Case ACA-2024-0528878)

Dear eSafety Commissioner,

I am writing to lodge a formal complaint about a **coordinated international harassment, defamation, and incitement campaign** being waged against me and my business. I am an Australian citizen and the developer/owner of *Legion Killfeed*, an online Discord-based service (ABN 28387377607). Over the past week, a group of individuals from multiple countries has orchestrated a targeted attack involving online defamation, calls to commit fraud (chargebacks), and efforts to disrupt my business operations. This letter outlines the background (including a previous unresolved complaint), a timeline of the current incident, the parties involved (despite being overseas, their actions are causing harm in Australia), the impact on my mental health and business, and my **urgent request** for the eSafety Commissioner's intervention in investigating and removing the malicious content.

Background: Previous Harassment and Unresolved Case (Ref: ACA-2024-0528878)

By way of background, I have unfortunately been the target of severe online harassment before. In mid-2024, I filed an **Adult Cyber Abuse complaint** with eSafety (Receipt **ACA-2024-0528878**) and also sought help from NSW Police regarding an earlier sustained attack. In that prior case, a former associate-turned-competitor (and his collaborators) engaged in a prolonged campaign of cyber abuse against me. This included:

- **Stalking, Doxing and Personal Harassment:** The perpetrators repeatedly stalked me across platforms (Discord, Reddit, Facebook, Twitter) and even circulated **personal photos** of my young children without consent. They sent these images to others in our community in an effort to intimidate and distress me.
- **Slandering Attacks and Lies:** They created websites and posts dedicated to **slandering me and my service**, falsely accusing me of misconduct. At one point they spread the grotesque lie that I “rape my kids,” a **heinous and utterly false accusation** that left me devastated. They also bombarded me with messages telling me to “*kill yourself*,” driving me to the brink of a mental health crisis.

- **Cyberattacks and Sabotage Attempts:** These individuals admitted to launching DDoS attacks against my servers and threatened to leak or steal my software code (one attacker even uploaded parts of my code to AI platforms without permission). They continually lied about my work, claiming credit for my coding and disparaging my product to anyone who would listen. All of this was done with the intent to ruin my reputation and business (Legion Killfeed).

Despite the **severity of this abuse** and the evidence I provided (including screenshots and links to the abusive content), **no effective action was taken** on case ACA-2024-0528878. I was informed that my reports were received, but **the harmful content remained online and the harassment continued**. Law enforcement involvement at the time (NSW Police) also did not result in any resolution or protection for me. Regrettably, the lack of consequences for those earlier attackers left me vulnerable and likely emboldened others. This unresolved case sets the context for why I have had to escalate matters internationally in the current incident – I am determined not to endure another round of unchecked harassment without a robust response.

Summary of the Current Incident (July–August 2025)

What is happening now is a concerted, cross-platform smear campaign against me and *Legion Killfeed*, carried out by a new group of individuals (including competitors and disgruntled former users) largely based overseas. Below is a timeline and summary of key events in this **ongoing incident**:

- **28 July 2025 – Flashpoint on Facebook:** An individual named **Daniel Santos** (online alias “dani23COVID” on Discord) published a **defamatory post** in a public DayZ gaming Facebook group, which became the flashpoint for a mob-style attack. In this post (URL: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/299960322481369/posts/757760916701305/>), Mr. Santos **falsely accused my service of “scamming” customers and abusing users**, and he explicitly encouraged others to “*take down*” my business. This was not a good-faith complaint but rather an incitement for a dogpiling attack. The post quickly gained traction and attracted a **crowd of commenters** eager to join in maligning me.
- **29–31 July 2025 – Coordinated Defamation and Harassment:** In the days immediately following the initial post, **multiple individuals joined the Facebook comment thread to amplify the harassment and escalate it beyond Facebook**. Notably:
- **Danny Hayes (UK-based competitor):** Mr. Hayes, who operates a competing service in the UK, seized on the opportunity to rally others against me. In the comments he **openly urged members of the group to mass-report Legion Killfeed on various platforms** and to flood us with negative reviews. For example, he wrote “*Here is the report link guys... Please report to Discord 🙌 I have reported*”

the Facebook and filed a report against scammers... as well as a bad review...” – effectively coordinating an attack on my Discord server, our Facebook page, and our reputation on external sites. He even **encouraged fraudulent chargebacks** against my business, telling users that *“that’s the fix then – PayPal refund and don’t use [Legion] again!”* This call to initiate false PayPal refund claims is essentially incitement of fraud, intended to **financially cripple my business**. Mr. Hayes’s involvement is particularly troubling given that he is a direct competitor and appears to be orchestrating this to eliminate competition.

- **Zeus Lozano:** Another individual in the thread (purportedly from Canada) going by this name injected a blatant lie into the discussion, claiming that I had “stolen” his server configuration. He urged others *“please report both the server and discord”* based on this false allegation. This accusation is entirely fabricated – I have never had any interaction with this person’s server files. It was clearly made **to incite more hatred and mass reporting** against me under false pretenses.
- **Dan Ahern:** This individual (location unknown, possibly U.S.) also joined the dogpile, contributing to the abusive comments. While his specific remarks were less notable than others’, his participation added to the **volume of harassment** and group mentality of the attack.
- **Brett Jones (alias “MrTechN9ne”):** Mr. Jones (believed to be in the U.S.) is a former affiliate of Legion Killfeed who harbors a personal grudge after being removed from our community for misconduct. Upon seeing the Facebook pile-on, he added **extreme slander** to the mix. In a Discord chat related to this campaign, Mr. Jones **falsely and heinously labeled me a “pedophile.”** This outrageous lie has absolutely no basis in reality; it appears to be a malicious attempt to permanently destroy my personal and professional reputation. (Notably, Mr. Jones had made similar defamatory outbursts earlier in July 2025, which led to his ban from my service – our *Terms of Service* at <https://killfeed.co/legal> strictly prohibit such conduct, and he was expelled accordingly.) His involvement in the current campaign underscores how **personal grudges are being interwoven into this coordinated attack**, further escalating its viciousness.
- **Ongoing Harassment and Threats:** Throughout this period (late July into early August), I have been subjected to a barrage of **abusive insults and implied threats** across platforms. In the Facebook comment thread and related Discord discussions, I was called **horrendous names** (e.g. *“trash,” “fing ct,” “potato-looking ct”*), **told to “go back to school or be reborn,”* and other degrading slurs. Mr. Santos (the original poster) at one point told me “Legion will fall one way or another, you are trash...”**, **essentially threatening to ruin my business. Mr. Hayes enthusiastically cheered this on, replying “couldn’t have said it better” in agreement with destroying my service. When I responded that I was contacting the authorities, the harassers openly mocked me for it – one person gleefully responded “hahaha this is AWESOME.”** Their behavior shows brazen confidence

and an intent to intimidate** me into silence, under the belief that they are beyond reach of consequences.

- **Spread to Other Platforms (Trustpilot Review Bombing):** What began on Facebook did not stay on Facebook. The same group of attackers **expanded their smear campaign to other public platforms** to maximize damage to my business's reputation. In late July 2025, they orchestrated a "review bombing" on **Trustpilot**, which is a popular public business review site. Over a short span, several newly-made Trustpilot accounts left **false, malicious 1-star reviews** for *Legion Killfeed*. These reviews clearly did **not** come from genuine customers, but rather from the harassers involved in the Facebook attack. Examples of these fake reviews include:
 - A user account literally named "**Cunt**" (a vulgar term) posted a defamatory review claiming we "*take people's money then block them*". This statement is entirely false – we have never taken money without providing our service, nor do we "block" paying customers – and the review was simply an insult-laden smear.
 - Another account under the name "**WARZONE**" left a similarly hostile review, calling our service "trash" and alleging "*these people aren't nice at all*", among other incendiary remarks. Again, this person was never a real customer; the review's sole purpose was to echo the harassment and scare others away from our service.
 - **Danny Hayes** himself contributed to the Trustpilot attack by posting a review under what appeared to be his real name. In his post (which Trustpilot has since flagged/removed for guideline violations), he described us as "*disgusting... nasty, toxic owners*" and warned readers "*you will regret purchasing*" our service. This was clearly an attempt by a competitor to **sabotage our reputation** and deter potential customers through defamatory statements.

As a result of this influx of fake negative reviews, our Trustpilot **profile** (<https://www.trustpilot.com/review/killfeed.co>) saw a sharp drop in rating, and any prospective customer visiting that page during the attack would have been confronted with vile falsehoods about our business. I have reported these fake reviews through Trustpilot's normal channels. While some action was taken (e.g. Mr. Hayes's review was removed by Trustpilot after being reported), as of this writing **several defamatory reviews remained online**, continuing to tarnish our reputation. I have attached an **image gallery of screenshots** (hosted at <https://postimg.cc/gallery/LpjVYZtT>) which contains evidence of the Facebook posts, Discord chats, and Trustpilot reviews referenced above, for your review.

In summary, this current campaign involves **a group of at least five individuals across multiple countries (UK, USA, Canada, and possibly Australia)** acting in concert to defame, harass, and cause business harm to me. They have utilized Facebook as the springboard for coordination, and then spread their attacks to **Discord, Trustpilot, and potentially other platforms**, all with the clear objective of damaging or shutting down my Australian-based business.

Key Individuals and Cross-Jurisdictional Factors

It is important to note that **many of the primary perpetrators are located overseas**: for instance, Mr. Danny Hayes (who appears to be one of the ringleaders instigating others) is in the **United Kingdom**; others such as Mr. Brett Jones and Mr. Daniel Santos are believed to be in the **United States** or Canada. There may be participants from Australia as well (one harasser in the Facebook thread was in Australia, though a minor player). Despite this geographically dispersed group, their actions are **directly causing harm within Australia**:

- The defamation and harassment against *me (an Australian citizen)* and *Legion Killfeed (an Australian-registered business)* are **accessible online in Australia**. Australian community members and customers of my service see these false posts and reviews, which damages my reputation **here at home**.
- The **harm—both emotional and financial—is being suffered on Australian soil**. I reside in Sydney; I am feeling the distress and anxiety here. My business operates in Australia and its revenue is being impacted in Australia. In other words, even if the bullies are pressing the keys from another country, the **victim and the damage are local**. This, I believe, firmly establishes an Australian jurisdictional interest in addressing the matter.
- Australian law and the eSafety Commissioner’s mandate exist to protect Australians from exactly this kind of online abuse, even when it crosses borders. While the perpetrators might be abroad, the **international nature of this case should not preclude action** – rather, it underscores the need for regulatory bodies like eSafety to coordinate with platforms and foreign counterparts to protect Australians from cross-border online harm.

I want to clarify one point of identity: the individual who ignited this campaign, **Daniel Santos**, is referred to by the handle “*dani23COVID*.” He used this alias in his Facebook post and it is also his Discord username. I mention this to avoid confusion – this is **not** a random Facebook group alias but a consistent online moniker he goes by. This alias is how he is known in gaming circles and how I and others identify him online.

Impact on Mental Health and Business Operations

This coordinated attack has had a **devastating impact on me personally and on my business**. I wish to emphasize how serious the situation has become:

- **Emotional and Mental Health Strain**: The onslaught of harassment – from being publicly labeled a scammer and even a “pedophile,” to receiving relentless insults and calls for my demise – has caused me intense distress. I have experienced **anxiety, fear, and sleepless nights** over the past week. This situation has sadly echoed the past trauma of the 2023–2024 harassment; I find myself once again in a state of heightened stress, fearful of answering messages or looking at social media because of what new attack might be waiting. As a private individual who simply runs a small tech business, being subjected to a **global campaign of vilification** is

extremely overwhelming and distressing. I have sought support from family and friends to cope, but the persistence and scale of this abuse continue to take a heavy psychological toll.

- **Business Disruption and Financial Harm:** The harassment campaign is not only an attack on my character but also a direct assault on my livelihood. The false accusations and negative reviews have **tarnished my company's online presence**, which can dissuade potential customers from using Legion Killfeed. In fact, I have already observed a drop in new user sign-ups since the smear campaign began. A few existing customers have contacted me with concerns after seeing the defamatory material, and I've had to spend valuable time reassuring clients and doing damage control, rather than improving my service or handling normal business operations. The **incitement of chargebacks and mass reports** is especially dangerous – if even a handful of people followed Mr. Hayes's call to file false PayPal disputes, I could face unwarranted financial losses or payment account issues. Similarly, coordinated false reports to platforms (Discord, Facebook) could lead to temporary suspensions of our service channels if not properly understood as malicious – a risk that puts our entire business continuity in jeopardy. In short, this campaign is **sabotaging my business from multiple angles**: reputational damage, loss of customers, and the looming threat of financial fraud and platform sanctions due to false reports.
- **Ongoing Fear and Urgency:** The content fueling this harassment remains live on major platforms (as of 4 August 2025, the original Facebook post and some of the fake Trustpilot reviews are still up, continuously attracting views). Every hour that these posts stay online, my **name and business are dragged further through the mud** and the attackers gain more opportunity to recruit others or intensify their efforts. I am in constant fear that they will escalate further – perhaps targeting other review sites, contacting my payment processors with false claims, or even attempting to hack or DDoS my services again. This has created an environment where I feel under siege 24/7, unsure where the next blow will come from. It is profoundly affecting my ability to work and live peacefully.

Given these impacts, I want to stress that this is **not a case of mere rude comments on the internet** or one-off criticism. It is a deliberate, sustained campaign intended to cause maximum harm. I am **mentally and financially vulnerable** right now because of these attacks, and I urgently need assistance in stopping them.

Actions Taken To Date (and Need for Escalation)

I have been proactive in trying to mitigate and resolve this situation through various channels, but I have reached the limit of what I can do alone, especially since much of the abuse originates overseas. Here is what I have done so far:

- **Platform Reports:** I have reported the offending content on the platforms where it appears. This includes reporting the Facebook group post and several of the worst comments (to Facebook/Meta), reporting the abusive Discord messages/users on

Discord, and flagging the fake reviews on Trustpilot. Some of these reports have yielded partial results (e.g., a couple of the Trustpilot reviews were removed after being flagged, and one of Mr. Santos's Facebook posts was eventually hidden by a group admin after complaints), but **the core content remains and the harassers themselves remain active**. The Facebook post link I provided is, at the time of writing, still accessible, and the discussion around it persists. My attempts to have Facebook remove it via standard reporting have not yet succeeded. This lack of complete response from platforms is what led me to escalate my approach.

- **Contacting Overseas Law Enforcement:** Realizing that one of the primary instigators, Mr. Danny Hayes, is UK-based – and noting that many aspects of this campaign violate UK laws (e.g. communications harassment, incitement to commit fraud) – I reached out to the **Thames Valley Police in the United Kingdom** to lodge a complaint. I did this as a logical escalation because the principal perpetrator is under UK jurisdiction, and I felt that involving UK law enforcement would put pressure on the situation from that end. (I have referenced the UK police case number **#43250388789** in communications with platforms like Facebook to underscore the seriousness of the matter.) The UK police have acknowledged my report, and I have provided them with evidence of the offenses occurring from their jurisdiction. However, any investigation or action from their side may take time and, by itself, will not address the urgent need to **take down the harmful content online** right now.
- **Compiling Evidence:** I have gathered a comprehensive evidence bundle which includes screenshots of the Facebook post and comment thread, copies of the defamatory Trustpilot reviews, logs of Discord chats where I was harassed, and links to any relevant posts. I have made this evidence available in an online gallery (as mentioned earlier, <https://posting.cc/gallery/LpjVYZtT>) and can provide it directly to the eSafety Office upon request. This evidence clearly documents the statements and actions I have described, and I am prepared to assist by providing any additional information needed to verify the facts of this case.

Despite these efforts, the harassment is **ongoing** and the **defamatory content remains public**. The international element (UK, US, Canada involvement) makes it challenging for me as an individual to stop it through any one national channel, which is why I am turning to the eSafety Commissioner. The eSafety Commission's ability to coordinate content takedowns and facilitate cross-jurisdictional cooperation is, in my view, crucial to resolving this.

Request for Urgent Investigation and Remedial Action

I am respectfully requesting the eSafety Commissioner's urgent assistance in putting a stop to this coordinated online attack and mitigating its harmful effects. Specifically, I ask that your office:

1. **Investigate this matter under the Adult Cyber Abuse scheme** (or any other relevant framework) as a serious case of coordinated online abuse targeting an

Australian individual. The content and conduct I have described – repeated harassment, explicit encouragement of self-harm, vicious defamation (e.g. false accusations of heinous crimes), and organized attempts to financially harm – appear to clearly meet the threshold of *adult cyber-abuse material* that is menacing, harassing or offensive and intended to cause serious harm. I urge the eSafety team to review the evidence I've provided and confirm this.

2. **Issue takedown notices or requests** to the relevant platforms (Facebook/Meta, Trustpilot, Discord, and any others necessary) for the removal of the specific defamatory and harassing content. This should include the takedown of the original Facebook group post by Daniel Santos and its comment thread, removal of any related posts or groups facilitating the harassment, deletion of the fake reviews on Trustpilot, and any necessary action on Discord (e.g. disabling accounts that are solely used to harass). Your intervention can carry weight where my individual reports have not – platforms are more likely to remove content when prompted by a regulator's notice. Prompt removal is critical to stem the spread of damage.
3. **Facilitate cross-platform and cross-border coordination:** I recognize that some perpetrators are outside of Australia, but the eSafety Commissioner's office can still play a role in coordinating with international counterparts or directly with the platforms' trust & safety teams. I ask that you liaise, as needed, with overseas authorities (for instance, you may communicate with the UK's Thames Valley Police or through any existing inter-governmental channels for online safety) to ensure that the individuals inciting this abuse are identified and that steps are taken to prevent them from simply moving their harassment elsewhere. Even if eSafety's formal powers may be limited to ensuring content removal, your support in the broader law-enforcement effort (by sharing intelligence or advising on Australian aspects of the case) would be invaluable.
4. **Address the prior unresolved case (ACA-2024-0528878) as context:** While my main focus is on stopping the current incident, I believe the history here is relevant. The fact that the previous attackers faced no repercussions arguably set the stage for continued abuse. I request that, if possible, the eSafety Office review why the 2024 complaint did not yield a resolution, and consider this ongoing pattern in handling my new complaint. This is not a singular occurrence but part of a **longer-term victimization** of me and my business. Recognizing the link may help in formulating a more effective and lasting solution (for example, by noticing common perpetrators or tactics used).

Finally, I want to emphasize the **urgency** of this situation. Every day that the defamatory content stays up and the harassers remain free to continue, my personal wellbeing and my business prospects deteriorate further. I am struggling to keep my business running under this barrage, and I fear that without swift intervention, the damage to my reputation might become irreparable or, worse, that I might reach a breaking point emotionally. I am **determined to pursue all available avenues to seek justice and protection**, and I regard the eSafety Commissioner as a critical ally in this fight given your office's mandate to safeguard Australians from exactly this sort of online harm.

Thank you for taking the time to read this detailed complaint. I appreciate that the eSafety Commission has the challenging task of dealing with complex cyber abuse cases, and I am hopeful that with your involvement we can put an end to this nightmare. I am available at any time to provide further information, discuss the case, or assist in whatever way possible. Please do not hesitate to contact me via email or phone (I can provide a number if required) to follow up on this complaint.

Sincerely,

Anthony Brodie
Sydney, NSW, Australia
Owner/Developer, Legion Killfeed Discord Service
